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Symposium – Blocking the Courthouse Door: Federal Civil 
Procedure Obstacles to Justice  
Due Process and the Myth of Sovereignty 
Michael Vitiello* 
 
In Animating Civil Procedure, I argued that the Supreme Court has repeatedly 
used procedural law as a way to narrow access to our courts.1 Most often, the right 
wing of the Court has led the way and done so in cases where powerful entities, 
often mega-corporations, are the beneficiaries of the Court’s decision.2 I further 
argued that the public does not react to such decisions or if members of the public 
do so, their responses are far more tepid than their responses to the Court’s 
controversial substantive decisions.3 The net result of the Court’s procedural 
activism is to erode the rule of law:  access to court is a hallmark of our system of 
justice and closing the courthouse door prevents many defendants from answering 
for harm that those entities have caused.4 
Animating Civil Procedure focused on the Roberts Court’s personal 
jurisdiction case law. In the modern world of expanded interstate and international 
trade and travel, with instant efficient and inexpensive communication across the 
globe, one would have thought that the jurisdiction arm of our courts would 
lengthen to ensure that plaintiffs have ready access to a convenient court.5 The 
Court’s recent personal jurisdiction cases have repeatedly narrowed the court’s 
jurisdictional reach.6 In 2017, after publication of my book, the Court again ruled 
against a group of plaintiffs in favor of a multibillion-dollar corporation in a 
decision that leaves many civil procedure scholars stunned. Bristol-Myers Squibb 
Co. v. Superior Court (BMS) is yet another major example of the Court’s new 
protection for corporate defendants.7 
Imagine that plaintiffs from around the United States used a multibillion-dollar 
pharmaceutical company’s product.8 Imagine also that resident and non-resident 
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plaintiffs attempted to join in a single lawsuit against the defendant in California, 
a state where the defendant has several hundred employees and maintains various 
facilities, including research laboratories near the Silicon Valley, and sells 
hundreds of millions of pills alleged to have caused the plaintiffs’ injuries.9 
Imagine finally that the pharmaceutical company made almost a billion dollars 
from sales in California alone over a several year period.10 Does a California court 
have personal jurisdiction over the defendant such that it can hear claims not only 
by Californians but also out-of-state plaintiffs? 
For so many reasons, one might have thought that the corporation received 
many benefits from serving the California market, had such a large “presence” 
within the state, and could claim no inconvenience in defending in the forum state 
that jurisdiction would be a foregone conclusion.11 Not so under the Roberts’ Court 
jurisdiction-shrinking view of due process.12 
A number of scholars have criticized BMS.13 For example, Professor Mike 
Hoffheimer has called the Court’s decision part of a “stealth revolution,” whereby 
the Roberts Court has spoken as if it is merely applying traditional due process 
doctrine to new sets of facts.14 The Court claims this is the case despite the fact 
that it has repeatedly narrowed access to courts, radically altering traditional 
doctrine.15 
I use this opportunity to make a different point about BMS and the Court’s 
analysis of due process. As I discussed in Animating Civil Procedure, the Court 
has never offered a compelling explanation for why its due process test focuses on 
anything more than whether a defendant had fair notice and an opportunity to be 
heard.16 While that protection seems to underlie the Court’s “reasonableness” 
analysis, the Court requires more than a showing that a defendant is not burdened 
by answering a suit in an otherwise entirely convenient forum.17 
The Court’s formula for personal jurisdiction states that a defendant must have 
sufficient minimum contacts with a forum state so that the assertion of jurisdiction 
comports with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.18 Most often, 
when the Court has narrowed access to court, it has used the minimum contacts 
part of its test to erect a barrier to suit.19 As I have argued elsewhere, the Court has 
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never offered a compelling explanation for why minimum contacts with the forum 
are important even in instances where a plaintiff has brought suit in a forum that is 
uncontestably convenient for the defendant.20 The Court has offered a number of 
explanations, including briefly and unconvincingly a state’s interest to protect its 
residents from being haled into court in another forum.21 BMS seems to revert to 
that explanation for the importance of the contacts part of the Court’s due process 
analysis.22 Somehow, federalism explains why jurisdiction is improper for some 
reason that is hard to articulate.23 
This explanation is yet another example of an unconvincing make-weight to 
justify protecting corporate defendants from defending themselves in otherwise 
entirely convenient fora, and indeed, often in states where those corporations are 
reaping in billions of dollars from their in-state business activities. 
Part I of this paper examines BMS.24 Part II examines the Court’s previous 
unconvincing efforts to explain the relevance of federalism in its due process 
analysis.25 It also explores the BMS Court’s justification for this rationale in light 
of historic understanding of jurisdiction and in light of modern commercial 
realities.26 Part III reviews scholarly efforts to explain BMS. There, I also explore 
what policies might explain the willingness of the liberal wing of the Court to join 
a decision that obviously favors mega-corporations.27 At the end of the day, the 
Court’s analysis is a make-weight to justify shutting the courthouse door without 
plausible grounding in due process.28 
I. PART I 
Bristol-Myers Squibb (BMS) is one of the largest pharmaceutical companies 
in the world with thousands of employees and about $20 billion in revenue 
annually.29 While over half of its work force is in New York and New Jersey, the 
company has a large footprint in California.30 BMS has five laboratories in 
California where about 160 employees work.31 It has a sales force of about 250 
 
20.  Id. at 37; Michael Vitiello, Limiting Access to U.S. Courts: The Supreme Court’s New Personal 
Jurisdiction Case Law, 21 UC DAVIS J. OF INT’L LAW & POL’Y  209, 217–18 (2015). 
21.  See World–Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). 
22.  See infra Part I. 
23.  Id. 
24.  Id. 
25.  See infra Part II. 
26.  Id. 
27.  See infra Part III. 
28.  Id. 
29.  Bristol–Myers Squibb Company History, FUNDINGUNIVERSE, http://www.fundinguniverse.com/comp 
any-histories/bristol-myers-squibb-company-history/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2019) (on file with The University of the 
Pacific Law Review). 
30.  Bristol–Myers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1778. 
31.  Id. 
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people in the state and a state-government advocacy office in Sacramento.32 
BMS produces and sells Plavix, a blood thinner.33 In the early 2000’s, Plavix 
was BMS’s best-selling product.34 Indeed, in 2009, U.S. sales of Plavix exceeded 
$9 billion.35 The manufacturing, labeling, and work on gaining regulatory approval 
of Plavix did not take place in California.36 Between 2006 and 2016, BMS sold 
about 187 million Plavix pills in California, taking in more than $900 million from 
those sales over that period of time.37 Beyond doubt, BMS sold many other drugs 
in California as well.38 
When concerns surfaced about Plavix’s side effects, a large group of plaintiffs, 
including California residents and residents from 33 other states, filed complaints 
against BMS in California state court.39 The nonresident plaintiffs did not allege 
any facts connecting their purchase of the drug with California or any other way 
that their injuries arose out of forum activity.40 For example, they did not allege 
that they bought Plavix while they were in the state or that BMS marketed the drug 
nationwide from California.41 BMS retained McKesson Corporation, 
headquartered in California, to distribute Plavix nationwide.42 The non-California 
plaintiffs, however, did not allege that McKesson’s marketed activities resulted in 
their purchases of Plavix.43 
BMS moved to dismiss the nonresidents’ complaints on the grounds that the 
court lacked personal jurisdiction over BMS.44 The California Court of Appeal and 
Supreme Court held that the court had personal jurisdiction.45 The United States 
Supreme Court reversed.46 
The plaintiffs filed their actions in 2012, after the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown,47 but before the Court’s 
 
32.  Id. 
33.  Id. 
34.  John Carreyrou & Joann S. Lublin, How Bristol–Myers Fumbled Defense of $4 Billion Drug, WALL 
ST. J., (Sept. 2, 2006, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB115716250362552502 (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review). 
35.  Eric EJ. Topol & Nicholas NJ. Schork, Catapulting Clopidogrel Pharmacogenomics Forward, 17 
NATURE MED. 40, 40 (2011). 
36.  Bristol–Myers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1778.  
37.  Id.  
38.  See Shop Bristol–Myers Squibb Pharmaceuticals, MCKESSON, https://mms.mckesson.com/catalog?no 
de=402975+5566559 (last visited Feb. 4, 2019) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
39.  Bristol–Myers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1778. 
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decision in Daimler AG v. Bauman.48 Despite indications in Goodyear that the 
Court was about to narrow general jurisdiction, the California trial court found that 
jurisdiction was proper under a general jurisdiction theory.49 By the time the case 
arrived in the California Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court had decided Daimler, 
dramatically narrowing general jurisdiction.50 While the California appellate and 
Supreme Court found that jurisdiction was not proper under a general jurisdiction 
theory, they found that jurisdiction was proper under a specific jurisdiction 
theory.51 
Clearly, California courts had personal jurisdiction over BMS for purposes of 
suits by Californian plaintiffs who purchased and used Plavix in California.52  The 
case for jurisdiction over those claims was air-tight: BMS acted with purpose in 
selling the harm-causing product in-state.53 Since the development of its contacts 
analysis, the Supreme Court has interchangeably stated the black letter law: a claim 
had to either arise out of or be related to the defendant’s in-state contacts.54 Chief 
Justice Cantil-Sakauye relied on the “related to” language to uphold jurisdiction 
over BMS in claims by non-resident plaintiffs: “A claim need not arise directly 
from the defendant’s forum contacts in order to be sufficiently related to the 
contact to warrant the exercise of specific jurisdiction. Rather, as long as the claim 
bears a substantial connection to the nonresident’s forum contacts, the exercise of 
specific jurisdiction is appropriate.”55 She went further to apply a theory 
recognized by some courts:  sometimes called a “sliding scale” analysis.56 Thus, 
even if a claim does not arise out of the forum contacts, jurisdiction may be proper 
in light of substantial contacts with the forum. The Chief Justice also found that 
the assertion of jurisdiction satisfied the reasonableness part of the Supreme 
Court’s due process analysis.57 
The Supreme Court disagreed.58 Writing for the Court, Justice Alito focused 
on what now seems significant (but something that in the past seemed quite 
irrelevant): BMS, a massive international corporation, conducted most of its 
activity outside of California.59 Justice Alito also focused on other facts unrelated 
to California. First, the nonresident plaintiffs did not obtain the drug from 
 
48.  571 U.S. 117 (2014). 
49.  Bristol–Myers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1778. 
50.  Id. 
51.  Id. at 1778–79. 
52.  Id. at 1781. 
53.  Id. at 1786. 
54.  See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 
(1985); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
55.  Bristol–Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Court, 1 Cal. 5th 783, 803 (2016). 
56.  Id. at 792. 
57.  Id. at 808. 
58.  Bristol–Myers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1778. 
59.  VITIELLO, supra note 1, at 57. 
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California. Second, BMS did not manufacture or distribute the drug in California.60 
Third, BMS did not work on regulatory compliance material from California.61 
Finally, although Justice Alito recognized that BMS hired McKesson, 
headquartered in California, to develop its marketing strategy, the nonresident 
plaintiffs did not allege that BMS directed its marketing strategy from California.62 
The Court’s opinion ends any argument that a plaintiff can rely on a sliding-
scale approach to jurisdiction.63 According to Justice Alito, that approach 
effectively is a general jurisdiction theory dressed up in specific jurisdiction 
language.64 
The most important part of Justice Alito’s discussion for purposes of this paper 
is his explanation of the role of federalism and state borders in defining the Court’s 
due process test. In discussing the limitations imposed by Fourteenth Amendment 
due process, Justice Alito did not make a clear distinction between the minimum 
contacts analysis and the reasonableness part of the analysis.65 In some cases, the 
Court has focused on the separate aspects of its analysis as serving distinct 
interests. Thus, in World-Wide Volkswagen, the Court did not reach its 
reasonableness analysis because it found that the defendants, a New York car 
dealer and a New York—New Jersey—Connecticut distributor, lacked sufficient 
contacts with the forum state because they did no purposeful act within the state.66 
Further, Justice White’s majority opinion explained the contacts part of the 
analysis in federalism terms.67 
Justice Alito did not make that the clear distinction between contacts analysis 
and fairness-reasonableness factors.68 Instead of focusing on contacts as a separate 
step in the analysis, he seemed to lump the two aspects of the Court’s test, but to 
explain the due process test in terms of federalism.69 As he stated for the Court, 
“In determining whether personal jurisdiction is present, a court must consider a 
variety of interests. These include ‘the interests of the forum State and of the 
plaintiff in proceeding with the cause in the plaintiff’s forum of choice.’”70  Beyond 
that though, he observed that the “primary concern” of the Court’s due process 
analysis is “the burden on the defendant.”71 This discussion seems like the fairness-
reasonableness part of the analysis, effectively a balancing of competing interests. 
What is new in the Court’s analysis is the unusual importance of the burden 
 
60.  Bristol–Myers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1778. 
61.  Id. at 1778. 
62.  Id. at 1783. 
63.  Id. at 1781. 
64.  Id. 
65.  Id. at 1779. 
66.  World–Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 295. 
67.  Id. at 293. 
68.  Bristol–Myers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1780–81. 
69.  Id. at 1780–81. 
70.  Id. at 1780. 
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on the defendant that somehow weaves in federalism concerns. Here is a fairly 
extensive quotation of that point: 
Assessing this burden obviously requires a court to consider the practical 
problems resulting from litigating in the forum, but it also encompasses 
the more abstract matter of submitting to the coercive power of a State that 
may have little legitimate interest in the claims in question . . . As we have 
put it, restrictions on personal jurisdiction “are more than a guarantee of 
immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation. They are a consequence 
of territorial limitations on the power of the respective States.” . . . “[T]he 
States retain many essential attributes of sovereignty, including, in 
particular, the sovereign power to try causes in their courts. The 
sovereignty of each State . . . implie[s] a limitation on the sovereignty of 
all its sister States” . . . And at times, this federalism interest may be 
decisive. As we explained in World–Wide Volkswagen, “[e]ven if the 
defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience from being forced to 
litigate before the tribunals of another State; even if the forum State has a 
strong interest in applying its law to the controversy; even if the forum 
State is the most convenient location for litigation, the Due Process Clause, 
acting as an instrument of interstate federalism, may sometimes act to 
divest the State of its power to render a valid judgment.”72 
As indicated above, the Court previously organized the analysis differently, 
first deciding the sufficiency of the contacts and second, only if the contacts were 
sufficient would it turn to the reasonableness factors.73 In Justice White’s view, 
federalism explained the contacts part of the analysis, while the due process 
assessment would follow only after a court found sufficient contacts.74 Justice 
Alito merged the questions: in evaluating the burden on the defendant, a court must 
evaluate federalism and state sovereignty considerations.75 
After reciting the special importance of the burden on the defendant (with 
particular emphasis on sovereignty), the Court seemed to return to the lack of 
sufficient contacts with the forum. It did not find, for example, that BMS faced any 
particular burden in defending the several suits in California.76 That is, while BMS 
had extensive contacts with the forum, the nonresident plaintiffs’ claims did not 
arise out of those contacts.77 Perhaps the case did not turn on any special burden 
faced by BMS in defending in California because it admitted that it faced no special 
 
72.  Id. at 1776, 1780 
73.  Id. at 1780.  
74.  World–Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 294.  
75.  Bristol–Myers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1780–81. 
76.  Id. at 1781. 
77.  Id. 
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burden in defending there.78 
In finding that the assertion of jurisdiction over the nonresidents’ claims 
violated due process, Justice Alito insisted that the Court was applying traditional 
due process principles.79 That is more than debatable.80 The next section focuses 
on some of the Court’s earlier efforts to explain the significance of states’ interest 
in the jurisdictional arena. 
II. PART II 
Professor Rich Freer and Dean Wendy Perdue’s case book poses a question in 
notes after International Shoe v. Washington. The hypothetical starts with an 
International Shoe delivery truck striking a pedestrian in Colorado.81  The 
pedestrian has a vacation home in Illinois, located quite close to St. Louis, 
Missouri, where International Shoe has its headquarters. Deciding that it would be 
quite convenient to litigate in Illinois, the pedestrian wants to file suit in that state. 
The editors ask whether the pedestrian can do so.82 
The question presents students with the tension between contacts analysis and 
what would seem to be the limitations imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
due process clause. Assume that, instead of merely being convenient to bring suit 
in Illinois, the pedestrian had an especially strong interest in filing suit there. For 
example, assume that the Colorado accident led to significant physical impairment, 
leaving him bedridden and in need of special care provided near his Illinois home. 
Indeed, add an additional fact: the nearest courthouse in Missouri is located many 
miles further away from International Shoe’s headquarters than is the courthouse 
in Illinois. Would an Illinois court’s assertion of personal jurisdiction over 
International Shoe really violate due process?83 
The answer is counterintuitive and unequivocally, yes. But the reason why is 
more of a historical anomaly than it is a matter of principle. 
Think back to Pennoyer v. Neff.84 There, attorney Mitchell sued farmer Neff, 
one of his clients, for payment of a fee for legal services.  Mitchell began the suit 
in personam but had process served by publication in a newspaper, the appropriate 
method for commencing a suit in rem.85 When Neff did not respond to the suit, the 
court entered a default judgment.86 To satisfy the judgment, the sheriff sold land 
 
78.  See Bradt & Rave, supra note 13, at 1277. 
79.  Bristol–Myers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1779; Hoffheimer, supra note 13, at 523.  
80.  Hoffheimer, supra note 13, at 523. 
81.  RICHARD D. FREER & WENDY COLLINS PERDUE, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES, MATERIALS, AND 
QUESTIONS 44 (7th ed. 2016). 
82.  Id. 
83.  Cf. VITIELLO, supra note 1, at 36.  
84.  95 U.S. 714 (1877). 
85.  Id. at 714–15. 
86.  Id. at 720. 
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that Neff owned.87 Subsequently, Neff sued Pennoyer, who had bought the land 
after the sheriff’s sale, for ejectment.88 Pennoyer claimed ownership through the 
default judgment.89 
The Supreme Court found for Neff.90 A court would have to give effect to a 
judgment unless the judgment was improperly entered.91 Here, the Court found 
that the judgment was improper: the action was one in personam but Neff was not 
served in-hand, in-state in the original action.92 The Court reasoned that a state 
lacks authority to reach into another state to assert jurisdiction over a defendant in 
that state.93 A contrary holding would violate principles of international law:  one 
sovereign lacks the authority to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction.94 
Had that been the end of the Court’s analysis, the Court would have spared 
generations of law students the horror of reading its ornate decision. But in an 
elaborate dicta, the Court reasoned that its holding found support in the recently 
enacted Fourteenth Amendment.95 
Linking the requirement of in-hand, in-state service, seemingly justified based 
on principles of public international law, and Fourteenth Amendment due process 
is certainly an odd connection.96 The international law principle defends the rights 
of sovereign states.97 The Fourteenth Amendment by its own terms limits states’ 
power.98 Indeed, the Civil War largely repudiated the international principle that 
states within the union retained full sovereign powers.99 
The Court would eventually recognize Pennoyer’s fallacy. Even while 
searching for a new explanation of the role of state sovereignty in its due process 
analysis, the Court rejected “the shibboleth that ‘[t]he authority of every tribunal 
is necessarily restricted by the territorial limits of the State in which it is 
established,’” i.e., Pennoyer’s rationale.100 
The evolution of the Court’s due process analysis from Pennoyer to modern 
contacts analysis is a familiar story. The development of modern transportation 
ushered in the need for expanding the states’ jurisdictional reach: a motorist from 
 
87.  Id. at 724. 
88.  Id. at 715. 
89.  Id. at 720. 
90.  Id. at 736. 
91.  Id. at 728. 
92.  Id. at 727–28. 
93.  Id. at 733. 
94.  Id. at 730. 
95.  Id. at 732. 
96.  VITIELLO, supra note 1, at 23. 
97.  Harold S. Lewis, Three Deaths of State Sovereignty and the Curse of Abstraction in the Jurisprudence 
of Personal Jurisdiction, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699, 704 (1983). 
98.  Ronald D. Rotunda, The Powers of Congress Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment After City 
of Boerne v. Flores, 32 IND. L. REV. 163, 169 (1998). 
99.  VITIELLO, supra note 1, at 23. 
100.  World–Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 293.  
 
2019 / Due Process and the Myth of Sovereignty  
522 
out-of-state could cause damage in-state and leave before in-hand, in-state service 
of process.101 States created consent statutes, initially requiring an out-of-state 
motorist to appoint an in-state agent for purpose of receiving service of process.102 
Eventually, states adopted implied consent statutes, whereby driving on a state’s 
highway amounted to consent that allowed an injured person to serve the out-of-
state resident with process by serving a state official.103 
International Shoe, a corporation with its headquarters in Missouri, had a 
workforce in Washington.104 Over the course of several years, it refused to pay 
funds into Washington’s unemployment compensation fund.105 The Court rejected 
International Shoe’s efforts to frame the question of personal jurisdiction in terms 
of corporate presence in-state.106 Instead, it reformulated the test in now-familiar 
terms: “due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment 
in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain 
minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 
‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”107  Commentators have 
observed that International Shoe does not provide much in the way of a clear 
theoretical framework.108 In reliance on cases that had eroded Pennoyer’s rigid 
rule, the Court focused on notions of quid pro quo: a defendant with sufficient 
contacts with the forum state benefitted from in-state contacts, creating a reciprocal 
benefit to respond to a suit in-state.109 The Court also made a passing reference to 
“our federal system of government.”110 
While International Shoe pointed in different directions on the relationship of 
due process and state sovereignty, McGee v. International Life seemed to have 
developed a coherent theory.111 There, a Texas insurance company refused to pay 
the proceeds of a life insurance policy to McGee, the named beneficiary of the 
policy, after her son died.112 McGee sued in California; International Life failed to 
appear and McGee received a default judgment.113 When McGee attempted to 
collect on the judgment, the Texas courts refused to enforce the judgment on 
 
101.  Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927); Kane v. N.J., 242 U.S. 160 (1916). 
102.  Edwin W. Scott & Michael R. Bradley, Civil Procedure—Nonresident Motorist Statutes—Extent to 
Which Jurisdiction May Be Acquired, 7 VILL. L. REV. 472, 473 (1962). 
103.  Id. at 474. 
104.  Id. at 310. 
105.  Id. at 311. 
106.  Id. at 315. 
107.  Id. at 316. 
108.  Jeffrey M. Schmitt, Rethinking the State Sovereignty Interest in Personal Jurisdiction, 66 CASE W. 
L. REV.  774, 775 (2016). 
109.  Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 319.  
110.  Id. at 317. 
111.  McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); VITIELLO, supra note 1, at 27. 
112.  Id. at 222. 
113.  Id. at 221. 
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grounds that the California court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant.114 
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Black’s opinion articulated the modern 
view of due process.115 The Court focused on the ease of modern transportation 
and communication as relevant to the Court’s analysis.116 Unlike Pennoyer, which 
focused on the defendant’s state’s interest, McGee recognized the original forum 
state’s interest in protecting its citizens.117 The Court balanced a number of 
competing factors, including the burden on the defendant, the interest of the forum 
state, witness convenience, and the plaintiff’s need for the original forum.118 
Language in McGee suggested the overarching theme: did the assertion of 
jurisdiction over the defendant by a California court deny the defendant fair notice 
and the opportunity to be heard?119 If the answer was no, then the court did not 
violate the defendant’s due process rights.120 
I have argued elsewhere that McGee is the only case in which the Court 
articulated a coherent theory of due process.121 The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause makes no reference to states’ interests and its drafters were clearly 
repudiating the assertion by Southern States that they were separate sovereigns that 
were free to leave the Union.122 That view of McGee finds linguistic support in the 
amendment: the assertion of jurisdiction does deprive a defendant of property or, 
perhaps, liberty, but if the defendant had fair notice and an opportunity to defend 
the suit, the judgment was valid.123 
McGee’s approach seemed to prevail for over twenty years despite a brief 
detour six months after the Court decided McGee.124 Donner, a Pennsylvania 
resident, consulted with a Delaware trust company before she moved to Florida.125 
Donner set up a trust amounting to about one-third of her estate that would go to 
one of her daughters’ children upon Donner’s death.126 Meanwhile, she left the 
other two-thirds of her estate to her other two daughters, who would benefit from 
her will.127 Over an eight-year period, the trust company corresponded with  
Donner after she moved to Florida, where she died.128 
The two daughters who were to inherit about $500,000 each under Donner’s 
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will sought to have the Florida probate court rule that the Delaware trust was 
invalid.129 Had they succeeded, the trust funds would have become part of 
Donner’s estate and would have gone to the two daughters.130 The Florida court 
found that it had jurisdiction over the Delaware trust company.131 At the same time, 
Elizabeth Hanson, whose sons were to receive the proceeds from the trust, brought 
suit in Delaware to have the trust upheld.132 The Delaware court found for 
Hanson.133 Hanson v. Denckla presented the Court with difficult issues, including 
the personal jurisdiction question.134 
If the Court had applied its newly minted test from McGee, the two sisters 
would have undone Donner’s donative intent and deprived their nephews of their 
inheritance.135 The Court divided 5-4 and found that the Florida court lacked 
personal jurisdiction over the Delaware trust company.136 Chief Justice Warren 
explained away McGee: although McGee failed to make the distinction, the Chief 
Justice claimed that International Life’s contact with the forum state came about 
through purposeful activity in the forum state.137 Justice Black’s dissent pointed 
out that the trust company certainly knew that it had contact with Florida: it 
maintained a business relationship with Donner over an eight-year period.138 The 
Chief Justice also rebutted the idea that state boundaries did not matter for due 
process analysis: constitutional limitations on personal jurisdiction “are a 
consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the respective States.”139 
For many years, courts treated McGee as the law, often ignoring or giving short 
shrift to Hanson.140 After all, not only was Hanson a 5-4 decision, but its result-
orientation was palpable.141 McGee found favor among many lower courts, 
including state courts that were expanding their reach, often to protect in-state 
residents against out-of-state corporate defendants.142 Indeed, while narrowing in 
rem jurisdiction in Shaffer v. Heitner, the Court seemed to endorse McGee’s 
framework: there, the Court observed that the “mutually exclusive sovereignty of 
the States” was not a “central concern of the inquiry into personal jurisdiction.”143 
As observed above, sovereignty made a comeback in World-Wide Volkswagen 
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Corp. v. Woodson in 1980.144 World-Wide created a two-step framework for 
analysis: first, a plaintiff had to demonstrate that the defendant had sufficient 
minimum contacts with the forum state.145 Second, only if the defendant had 
sufficient minimum contacts would the Court turn to the fairness-reasonableness 
factors.146 As I often quip when teaching the case, this was something of an unholy 
marriage of McGee (the reasonableness factors) and Hanson (the contacts 
requirement). In dicta, Justice White endorsed the stream of commerce basis for 
jurisdiction; that is jurisdiction would be proper when a defendant shipped a 
component part to a state other than the forum state with awareness that the product 
would end up in the forum).147 However, he insisted for the majority that only 
contacts that demonstrated purposeful availment of the forum met the due process 
test.148 
Justice White’s authority for the latter proposition was, of course, Hanson.149  
Despite having laid dormant since 1958, Hanson now came center stage in the 
Court’s new due process analysis.150 But what interest was served by the contacts 
part of the test? While disavowing Pennoyer’s “shibboleth,” Justice White asserted 
that “[t]he authority of every tribunal is necessarily restricted by the territorial 
limits of the State in which it is established.”151 
Hanson’s reemergence left commentators befuddled.152 If Pennoyer’s reliance 
on state sovereignty was rightly called “shibboleth,” how did the contacts analysis 
serve some state interest? Well, Justice White explained a mere two years after 
World-Wide that it did not serve a separate interest. In Insurance Corp. of Ireland 
v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, Justice White recanted: 
The restriction on state sovereign power described in World-Wide 
Volkswagen Corp., however, must be seen as ultimately a function of the 
individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process Clause. That 
Clause is the only source of the personal jurisdiction requirement and the 
Clause itself makes no mention of federalism concerns.153 
That certainly seems right, based on the language of the Due Process Clause 
and its history as a limitation on state power.154 Indeed, writing shortly after the 
Court decided Insurance Corp. of Ireland, one scholar predicted that the decision 
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signaled the death of the relevance of sovereignty as part of the personal 
jurisdictional analysis:  “Since the Court, so soon after World-Wide, reached so 
far to dispose of state sovereignty, this third death of the concept should prove 
more durable.”155 That prognosis, although seemingly incontestable, did not prove 
accurate.156 
Sovereignty and the contacts analysis, somehow distinct from basic fairness, 
did not die. Further, the Court has not developed a coherent theory to explain the 
increasingly important role that minimum contacts serves. That is, if McGee 
controls, the contacts analysis is not a separate bar to jurisdiction.157 
Justice Kennedy, writing for only four justices, claimed that the purposeful 
availment mattered because it signaled that the defendant intended to affiliate with 
the forum, in effect, consenting to that state’s jurisdiction.158 Critics jumped on that 
rationale:  Justice Kennedy seemed to be reintroducing the widely ridiculed and 
rejected implied consent rationale.159 In subsequent cases, Justice Kennedy did not 
re-urge his theory.160 
Fast-forward to the Court’s decision in BMS.  Justice Alito did not bifurcate 
the analysis as Justice White did in World-Wide.161 Instead, he seemed to be 
discussing the reasonableness factors, which include the burden on the 
defendant.162 But when he explained why a court had to give special weight to the 
burden on the defendant, the ghost of sovereignty emerged: 
Assessing this burden obviously requires a court to consider the practical 
problems resulting from litigating in the forum, but it also encompasses 
the more abstract matter of submitting to the coercive power of a State that 
may have little legitimate interest in the claims in question. As we have 
put it, restrictions on personal jurisdiction “are more than a guarantee of 
immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation. They are a consequence 
of territorial limitations on the power of the respective States” . . . [T]he 
States retain many essential attributes of sovereignty, including, in 
particular, the sovereign power to try causes in their courts.163 
I confess that I have little idea what Justice Alito, along with seven of his 
colleagues, mean in the language quoted above. I also confess that I hear a faint 
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groan, Justice White’s voice saying, didn’t you read my mea culpa in Insurance 
Corp. of Ireland? I cannot find a plausible explanation for the Court’s revived 
sovereignty theory. BMS merely reasserted, without plausible explanation, why 
state borders matter. 
Make no bones about it, though: the reliance on sovereignty and the 
importance of state borders narrows access to convenient fora for plaintiffs. In 
BMS, BMS conceded that defending suit in California was not inconvenient.164 
How could it be inconvenient? It had to defend numerous suits brought by 
California citizens.165 The parties consolidated the suits.166 Discovery would 
overlap in all of the suits.167 BMS has a substantial corporate presence in the state 
and makes many millions of dollars on its California business.168 No doubt, it 
retains a large staff of lawyers in California.169 A claim that it would not have fair 
notice and an opportunity to be heard on all of the claims, by in-state and out-of-
state plaintiffs would be frivolous.170 But future plaintiffs face fewer convenient 
places to sue mega-corporations where those plaintiffs choose to file their suits 
based on the BMS Court’s new, narrow view of relatedness, a new rule required in 
some unexplained way by state sovereignty.171 
Lest my comments seem flip, in the next section, I visit some scholarly 
attempts to explain or to justify the reliance on sovereignty. 
III. PART III 
Some scholars gave BMS a chilly response.172 For example, Professor 
Hoffheimer has argued that BMS is yet another example of the Roberts’ Court’s 
attempt to portray its radical new due process analysis as flowing naturally from 
controlling precedent.173 A few scholars have attempted to justify or at least explain 
the Court’s theory. 
Professor Jeffrey Schmitt has argued “that the law of personal jurisdiction 
must take sovereignty into serious account.”174 Schmitt’s Rethinking the State 
Sovereignty Interest in Personal Jurisdiction offers “a new interpretation of how 
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sovereignty should inform the doctrine.”175 Schmitt is clear that his theoretical 
justification is “a new argument.”176 In summary, his thesis is as follows:  “as a 
matter of state sovereignty, a state court may exercise jurisdiction only over a 
defendant that engaged in conduct that significantly implicated interests within the 
sphere of the state’s sovereign power, that is, the health, safety, and general welfare 
of its people.”177 
Schmitt begins his argument with the recognition that the Court has yet to 
articulate a coherent theory of sovereignty in its personal jurisdiction case law.178 
While many scholars conclude from the lack of coherent theory that none exists,179 
Schmitt wants to find such a justification, almost certainly as part of larger 
Federalist perspective, limiting not only federal but state power.180 
At its core, Schmitt argues that state governments have full sovereign power 
within their borders, unlike the federal government (a government limited by the 
specific powers granted in the Constitution).181 That sovereign power is affirmed 
in the Tenth Amendment.182 While each state is analogous to a sovereign state, the 
states’ powers come from the people: each state’s “general power of governing.”183 
Each state’s power to regulate is largely limited by its borders. A state’s police 
power “authorizes the assertion of adjudicatory power within the state.”184 But 
geography limits states’ power: “it is more difficult to justify a state’s assertion of 
sovereignty—whether regulatory or adjudicatory—over an out-of-state 
defendant.”185 Schmitt relies on cases dealing with the states’ regulatory power: 
“In the regulatory context, the Supreme Court has held that a state cannot directly 
regulate conduct ‘that takes place wholly outside of the State’s borders.’”186 Thus, 
states cannot assert extraterritorial jurisdiction, a limitation grounded in the 
Commerce Clause.187 
Schmitt acknowledges that the Court’s case law on extraterritorial jurisdiction 
is not without its problems. He recognizes that this idea of limiting the 
extraterritorial effect of a state’s power creates difficulties: “virtually every state 
regulation has effects beyond its borders.”188 But he relies on this line of cases to 
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make his core argument: that, as a general rule, states cannot project their laws on 
disputes that have nothing to do with conduct in their own borders.189 
The cases limiting extraterritorial application of a state’s laws are the 
regulatory cases referred to above.190 But Schmitt urges that those cases be applied 
with equal force to the adjudicatory cases, i.e., the personal jurisdiction cases.191 
Schmitt’s position seems partially prescriptive and partially descriptive when he 
argues that “[s]tate sovereignty concerns are equally applicable to the assertion of 
adjudicatory power over an out-of-state defendant as to the extraterritorial 
application of state regulatory power.”192 That is, he urges that the Court apply 
principles from its regulatory case law, and apply them to personal jurisdiction 
cases—the adjudicatory rules. He recognizes that constitutional text does not 
justify his theoretical argument, but he finds it in the structure of federalism.193 At 
the same time, he does not cite any Supreme Court case that has adopted his 
particular explanation for their results, other than in generalized federalism 
concerns.194 Thus, Schmitt argues that the Court should adopt his theory, 
presumably because it will produce sound results. 
That raises a number of questions. As indicated, Schmitt does not seriously 
contend that the text of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause justifies 
adoption of his sovereignty theory.195 To argue otherwise is implausible since the 
amendment is clearly a limitation on state power.196 What about the history of the 
Fourteenth Amendment as it relates to the assertion of personal jurisdiction?  
Indeed, the history of the amendment seems to undercut a core principle of 
Schmitt’s theory.197 And if history and text do not support a jurisdiction-narrowing 
rule, are there nonetheless good policy reasons to adopt a sovereignty-based theory 
of jurisdiction? Schmitt’s theory adapts rules from cases dealing with the 
regulatory power of the states and grafts them onto the adjudicatory power of the 
states.198 Does sound policy urge such a move? In an age of expanded interstate 
and international dealings, his jurisdiction-narrowing rule seems to make little 
sense.199 
Pennoyer supports the federalism-structural view of personal jurisdiction.200  
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Unless a plaintiff had an out-of-state defendant served in-hand, in-state, the court 
could not assert jurisdiction over that defendant.201 Thus, in Pennoyer, courts could 
not reach beyond Oregon’s borders to command a defendant in California to return 
to Oregon to respond to a suit in Oregon.202 Wait: does that really support Schmitt’s 
theory? Does borrowing limits on the regulatory power of one state to dictate 
conduct of citizens of other states work in many cases?  His theory works based 
on the facts in Pennoyer: the suit in Mitchell v. Neff, the case that gave rise to the 
judgment that led to the sheriff’s sale, was for a breach of contract.203 Neff failed 
to pay for legal services that Mitchell rendered in Oregon.  Hence, the Oregon suit 
would turn on the application of Oregon state law.  But such a conclusion is hardly 
inevitable when Pennoyer’s in-hand, in-state rule applied. 
A classic question to pose to students after they have read Pennoyer is what 
should Mitchell have done if he could not find Neff in Oregon? One hypothetical 
might ask whether suing and serving Neff in California would work. The answer 
is clearly yes. Many students balk if one spins off a different hypothetical: what if 
Mitchell sued Neff in Idaho, based on the same conduct?204 Again, some students 
find the result counterintuitive, clearly the Idaho court would have personal 
jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute. In such a case, wouldn’t the Idaho court be 
regulating extraterritorial conduct, seemingly in contradiction to one of Schmitt’s 
premises? The answer might be, no, Idaho would apply Oregon law and so would 
not be enforcing its own policies.205 
Maybe. Would Idaho apply Oregon law to Mitchell’s contract claim?  
Probably.206 Depending on Idaho’s choice of law rules, in theory, Idaho might 
apply Idaho substantive law. Would that mean that personal jurisdiction was not 
proper? It might raise concerns under the Supreme Court’s precedent limiting a 
state’s authority to apply its own law to a dispute.207 But historically, personal 
jurisdiction was proper beyond serious debate. 
A similar problem might have arisen if, for example, Mitchell learned that Neff 
owned property in Idaho and began his suit in rem by attaching that property. 
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Similar problems arise:  the Idaho court might apply its substantive law to the 
dispute and would again be regulating extraterritorial conduct (contract formation 
in Oregon). But under the law according to Pennoyer, the court would have 
jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim.208 
Take that one step further: assume that, had the out-of-state plaintiffs begun 
suit against BMS in California by attaching its substantial property holdings in 
California, under the law according to Pennoyer, the suit would not have violated 
due process.209 That would have been the case until 1978, when the Court narrowed 
assertions of in rem jurisdiction.210 What was clear as an historical matter, 
sovereignty did not prevent such suits.211 
Yet another example demonstrates that Schmitt’s sovereignty theory, 
grounded in limits on the extraterritorial application of a state’s law, has little 
historical support. At the outset of their decision to sue BMS, the plaintiffs believed 
that the California courts would have general jurisdiction over BMS.212  In such a 
case, one would need to determine, under California’s choice of law rules, which 
states’ substantive laws would control the litigation.213 Apparently, BMS feared 
that California would apply its pro-plaintiff substantive law, instead of the various 
out-of-state plaintiffs’ state law.214 But until Goodyear and Daimler, BMS’s 
substantial California contacts would have been sufficient to uphold jurisdiction.215 
Again, that question would have been quite distinct from the choice of law 
question. 
Although the Court has narrowed in rem and general jurisdiction, consider one 
more example where a state applies its law to regulate extraterritorial conduct:  
Imagine a defendant from Alaska on a week-long vacation in Florida, where a 
plaintiff from Alaska begins suit against the defendant. While the Court was deeply 
divided with no clear rule emerging, all nine justices who decided Burnham v. 
Superior Court would uphold jurisdiction on those facts.216 Yet again, we don’t 
know whether the Florida court would apply Florida law in the dispute, but that 
would not bear on the jurisdictional questions.217 
In the previous examples, courts would have had jurisdiction over the 
defendant or property. A separate question would be which states’ substantive law 
would apply. In the examples, I would wager that the forum state would apply 
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some other state’s substantive law under its choice of law principles.218 But a 
contrary holding would not deprive the court the power to hear the case. 
Schmitt fails to address a particularly difficult question if sovereignty really 
matters in personal jurisdiction analysis. His theory largely resuscitates Justice 
White’s World-Wide Volkswagen position.219 The reaction of World-Wide 
Volkswagen was swift and loud: if sovereignty underlies contacts analysis, how 
can an individual waive personal jurisdiction?220 Even prior to Pennoyer, courts 
recognized that defendants can consent to jurisdiction.221 By contrast, as is well 
established, parties cannot consent to a federal court’s subject matter 
jurisdiction.222 The difference, of course, is that states have an interest in limiting 
federal court subject matter jurisdiction, as reflected in Article III’s narrow 
delegation of judicial power.223 As a result, private litigants cannot waive subject 
matter jurisdiction. If, as Schmitt asserts, personal jurisdiction analysis must take 
into account extraterritorial application of a state’s laws, how can a private 
individual consent to jurisdiction in such a case? I find no answer in Rethinking 
the State Sovereignty Interest in Personal Jurisdiction.224 
If the text and history of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause do not 
dictate a significant role, if any, for sovereignty as a jurisdiction limiting principle, 
are there sound policies to support Schmitt’s thesis? No, as I have argued 
elsewhere.225 We live in an era of interstate and international commerce when 
communication and transportation may make the burden of defending a suit in a 
faraway forum almost non-existent.226 BMS admitted as much before the Supreme 
Court.227 Also as I argued in Animating Civil Procedure, the obvious winners of 
the Court’s new restrictive due process analysis are often mega-corporations.228 
One might ask whether policies other than a pro-corporate bias may have been 
at play in BMS. As two professors have argued, BMS was a case about forum-
shopping.229 Indeed, as Professors Bradt and Rave argue in Aggregation on 
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Defendants’ Terms:  Bristol-Myers Squibb and the Federalization of Mass-Tort 
Litigation, BMS’s lasting impact is likely to be on “the balance of power in 
complex litigation.”230 As developed below, perhaps the Court was more 
concerned about inappropriate forum-shopping than about basic personal 
jurisdiction doctrine. 
Upon filing in-state court in California, the plaintiffs in BMS seemed to have 
succeeded in significant forum-shopping, including blocking BMS from removing 
the action to federal court.231 By joining BMS’s marketing firm McKesson, BMS 
could not remove the action to federal court.232 By filing separately, rather than by 
seeking class certification, the plaintiffs avoided removal under the Class Action 
Fairness Act, which allows removal even absent complete diversity and even if a 
defendant is an in-state defendant.233 Thus, the plaintiffs seemed to skirt two 
developments that have often frustrated mass-tort plaintiffs.234 As summarized by 
Bradt and Rave: 
When, in the 1990s, numerous decisions by federal courts made it difficult 
to certify mass-tort class actions, plaintiffs’ lawyers turned to more 
accommodating states. To combat that tactic, defense-friendly interest 
groups convinced Congress to pass the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 
(CAFA), which expanded federal subject matter jurisdiction to return them 
to hostile federal courts.235 
BMS succeeded in outmaneuvering the plaintiffs by winning its motion to 
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.236 
The result of the Court’s holding in BMS largely favors defendants in the 
forum-shopping arena. Plaintiffs must either sue in their home states, if that is 
where they used a defendant’s product, or in a place where a corporate defendant 
is “at home.”237 In the vast majority of cases, a defendant is at home only in its 
state of incorporation or the state where it has its principal place of business.238  In 
the first instance, the group of plaintiffs joining in the suit is likely to be smaller 
than had BMS been decided in plaintiffs’ favor.239 Although not inevitable, large 
corporate defendants will often have a home court advantage in states where they 
are “at home.” That would seem to follow from the defendant’s choice to affiliate 
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with the state where it is at home.240 Further, local citizens may favor a large 
corporation that provides jobs and tax revenue to their local economy over 
plaintiffs from around the country, who may seem like interlopers.241 
Bradt and Rave, however, posit a third option. The third option is to file in 
their own home courts, if they can assert jurisdiction over the defendant based on 
a specific jurisdiction theory.242 But if the plaintiffs want efficiency, they can file 
in federal court and then use the special venue provision, § 1407,243 allowing a 
transfer of venue for purposes of pretrial proceedings. This thesis offers an 
interesting insight into BMS. 
Depending on the forum and circumstances, plaintiffs and defendants 
sometimes favor mass-tort litigation.244 Litigation against large corporations, like 
the tobacco industry, invited collaboration among plaintiffs.245 Plaintiffs may be 
able to locate extremely pro-plaintiff state courts, often in rural areas where jurors 
and judges showed a dislike for large out-of-state corporations.246 In some 
instances, defendants and business groups have favored aggregation of claims.247 
For example, in the 1960s, insurance companies sought to use interpleader as a 
way to take control of litigation, forcing injured plaintiffs to try their cases as part 
of a larger interpleader action.248 A defendant corporation might favor aggregation 
of claims in a jurisdiction where the state allows liberal use of offensive issue 
preclusion.249 Often, as Bradt and Rave suggest, a preference for aggregation may 
depend on where aggregation will take place.250 As CAFA demonstrates, 
defendants have felt more at home in federal than in state courts for over a 
decade.251 Given recent developments in Congress’s frustration of President 
Obama’s appointment of judges to the federal bench252 and Congress’s 
collaboration with President Trump to reshape the federal bench,253 that tendency 
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no doubt will continue. 
Insofar as BMS is a case about forum selection in mass-tort cases, who is the 
winner? MDL has real advantages, including very significant cost savings for the 
courts and for the litigants.254 Often, MDL ends the litigation with the judge 
moving the case to a global settlement.255 That seems like a net win for all of us, 
including plaintiffs and defendants.256 Bradt and Rave suggest that the solution, 
although not ideal, “offers potential benefits to plaintiffs and the court system as 
well by creating opportunities for mass resolution that can benefit all parties.”257 
Viewed as such, one might understand why three of the more liberal justices joined 
even though the decision tends to close the courthouse door in favor of large 
corporations over injured plaintiffs. 
Perhaps Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan joined Justice Alito’s opinion 
out of concern about undue forum-shopping. In Animating Civil Procedure, I 
speculated that the liberal justices might have narrowed general jurisdiction, for 
example, out of concern about unwarranted forum-shopping, rather than a simple 
pro-corporate bias.258 But, as Justice Sotomayor explained in her concurring 
opinion in Daimler, overly expansive use of general jurisdiction could have been 
addressed with a less extreme solution than the majority’s extreme revision of 
general jurisdiction standards.259 
In addition, the Court has not addressed openly why it disfavors plaintiff-
forum-shopping.260 Its decisions, including BMS, favor defendant-forum-shopping 
over plaintiff’s forum selection.261 The Court had an opportunity to decide the case 
on different grounds. For example, during oral argument, Justice Kagan asked 
what made the assertion of jurisdiction by the California court unconstitutionally 
unfair.262 BMS’s counsel objected to “California’s supposedly biased procedural 
and choice-of-law rules,”263 while counsel had to admit that the burden on 
defending in California was virtually non-existent.264 BMS’s position seemed to 
dictate examination of whether California had a sufficient interest to apply its 
substantive law to a dispute arising elsewhere.265 That poses a very different 
question than involved in BMS and revisiting the extent to which a state can apply 
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its law to a dispute arising elsewhere might be timely. Such a decision might 
squarely address unfair forum-shopping while keeping the courthouse door open 
in an otherwise convenient forum.266 
Consistent with Bradt and Rave’s article, one might also see BMS as an 
effective way to handle mass-tort litigation.267 Legal experts have long been 
concerned about developing an efficient method of handling mass-tort cases268 On 
occasion, as with CAFA269 and with § 1369,270 Congress has created narrow 
provisions to deal mass-tort and class action cases. But Congress has never created 
a “bill of peace” for litigation generally.271 Think back to the 1960s, when the 
insurance industry tried to use interpleader as a way to control tort litigation. For 
example, in State Farm v. Tashire, State Farm insured a driver in a major collision 
that occurred in northern California.272 Several injured plaintiffs filed actions 
against the bus company and truck driver involved in the action.273 State Farm filed 
an interpleader action in federal court in Oregon, a state that seemingly had nothing 
to do with the accident.274 The Supreme Court had to decide whether the use of 
federal statutory interpleader was proper.275 
When I teach Tashire, I try to get my students to see the brilliance of the 
attempted defense industry strategy. Subject matter jurisdiction was proper in 
federal court because § 1335 requires only minimal diversity.276 Personal 
jurisdiction was proper based on § 2361, allowing for nationwide service of 
process.277 Further, the federal court would apply the choice of law rules of the 
state where the federal court sits.278 Finally, interpleader is one of the exceptions 
to § 2283, the anti-injunction statute.279 Thus, the federal court has the power to 
enjoin state proceedings from the same accident.280 The district court found that 
interpleader was proper and enjoined the state proceedings. The Ninth Circuit 
found that interpleader was improper.281 While the Supreme Court found that 
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interpleader was proper, it held that the district court abused its discretion in 
enjoining the state court proceedings.282 
The Supreme Court recognized the defendants’ concerns about multiple 
litigation of claims arising from the same transaction.283 Importantly, the Court 
ruled that Congress had not enacted a Bill of Peace.284 In effect, the Court held that 
the lower court was using a procedural device as a Bill of Peace, well beyond its 
intended procedural effect.285 
If Bradt and Rave are correct, BMS fell into the same trap as did the lower 
court in Tashire. Plaintiffs faced with mass-tort litigation will seek MDL as a 
matter of routine because the Court narrowed personal jurisdiction.286 Consciously 
or unconsciously, the Court distorted due process analysis to achieve a cost savings 
solution to mass-tort litigation.287 That would seem to be the job of Congress. In 
fact, Congress has addressed mass-torts when it enacted CAFA288 and § 1369.289 
The fact that those provisions did not apply to the litigation in BMS suggests that 
the Court’s use of personal jurisdiction to force litigants into MDL was illegitimate 
as a matter of policy. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Open the morning paper and you can find attacks on the rule of law. As I wrote 
this paper, for example, President Trump railed against former Attorney General 
Jeff Sessions and the Department of Justice for filing criminal charges against 
Trump loyalists up for reelection to Congress.290 Happily, such blatant attacks on 
the rule of law get the attention of the news media and the public.291 
As I have argued in Animating Civil Procedure, the Court has more subtly 
eroded the rule of law with its civil procedure decisions.292 Public outrage at the 
Court’s procedural decisions is unlikely.293 But the aggregate effect of those 
decisions is a powerful assault on the rule of law.294 A full set of formal substantive 
rights is worth little without a convenient forum in which to bring one’s claim, a 
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forum that allows access to information necessary to make one’s case.295 
BMS’s breadth is open to debate. Perhaps, as Professors Bradt and Rave have 
argued, it has little lasting effect on most lawsuits.296 But its reinsertion of 
federalism into the due process analysis narrows jurisdiction in some meaningful 
class of cases.297 Further, looking at only one decision at a time ignores the larger 
impact on access to justice.298 Finally, even the members of the Court advanced 
multiple policies in BMS, the winners are mega-corporations, the losers, injured 
plaintiffs.299 
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